14.1 The Hutton's report

Content, War in Iraq

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On July 21, 2003, the BBC is preparing to defend its journalists, including Andrew Gilligan, against the strong attack that Downing Street is bound to launch against them. The BBC will try to show that it accurately reported the information received from Dr Kelly. To convince Lord Hutton's judicial inquiry to believe Gilligan over Dr Kelly -who denied being the primary source of the BBC's information- will not be easy. Downing Street, and Mr Blair, will cooperate fully with Lord Hutton's inquiry. Lord Hutton made it clear that he intends to decide alone the extend of the inquiry. Until now, only Andrew Gilligan, the Today programme correspondant, was said to have had a conversation with Dr Kelly. Now, on July 22, it appears that he also talked to Susan Watts, the science editor of the BBC programme Newsnight. On the contrary of Gilligan she recorded their conversation and the tape will be given to Lord Hutton inquiry. In her programmen on June 2, 2003, she said that a "source" told her that Downing Street was deseperate for information and had exaggerated "out of all proportion" the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes. The BBC thinks that the tape is the "smoking gun" that will exonerate Gilligan. This tape could explain why the BBC stuck to its story and defended its journalists who both checked their stories with Dr Kelly before broadcasting them.

On July 24, 2003, Lord Hutton decided that the inquiry hearing will not be televised but the media and the public would be able to attend most of the proceedings.

The inquiry unto Dr Kelly's death will start on Friday August 1. It will then be adjourned for about two weeks to allow Lord Hutton to study the written evidence.

The first meeting of the inquiry in the death and the circumstances surrounding it took place on August 1, 2003. Lord Hutton said that he would be in complete charge, he will decide which witnesses to ask to come and the extend of the inquiry. Tony Blair, Alastair Campbell, Geoff Hoon, the BBC Chairman, Gavyn Davis, the BBC journalists Andrew Gilligan, Susan Watt and Gavin Hewitt, Mrs Kelly and possibly her daughter, a member of the Baha'i faith, some psychiatrists as well as many people from the Ministry of Defence. Lord Hutton adjourned the inquiry until August 11, as the funeral of Dr Kelly will take place next week. The inquiry will be in two phases. In the first one, information will be collected, a report will be written and distributed to the witnesses. Those whom he will fell necessary to hear again will be asked to come back to clarify their first deposition. It is not yet clear how long the inquiry will last and when the final report will be published. It is now believed on August 3 that the accusation by the Select Foreign Affairs Committee that Gilligan, the Today programme Defence journalist changed his story was wrong and the transcript should show that Gilligan was right in saying that he did not.

On August 9, 2003, The Guardian said that the first witness called by Lord Hutton before the inquiry he is heading would be Colonel Terence Taylor, a fellow UN inspector in Iraq in the 1990's and a senior fellow at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. He has been asked to come on August 11. Other other witnesses to be asked to give evidence next week include the BBC journalists Andrew Gilligan, Susan Watts and Gavin Hewitt, Richard Sambrook the BBC's director of news and officials from the Ministry of Defence. The government said that civil servants will be told to speak freely at the inquiry. No actions will be taken over what they say to Lord Hutton.

The inquiry in Dr David Kelly's death that really begins to morrow will settle Tony Blair's fate according to The Observer of August 10, 2003. Lord Hutton will spend the next two months looking at the claims and counterclaims surrounding the last two weeks of Dr Kelly's life.

In the first day of Lord Hutton's inquiry on August 11, 2003, the British government suffered a serious beating. A fellow colleague, Professor Terence Thomas Taylor, who was also an UN weapon inspector in Iraq in the 1990s, described Dr Kelly as a first class scientist. Two senior officials of the intelligence services shared Dr Kelly's concern about the wording of the September 2002 dossier and they informed their chiefs about it. They were especially unhappy about the language used more that by the content. In particular the mention that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of giving the order, was hotly disputed in the intelligence circles. Moreover it is now clear that Dr Kelly was much more important that the government conceded at first. Saying that he was a new "Walter Mitty" fantasist now looks ridiculously wrong. Dr Kelly was a senior UN weapon inspector in the 1990s, a well respected scientist in his field who advised MI6, the CIA and the British armed forces. For this he had full security clearing. This is far off the middle-grade official as painted at first by the government. However his paid was quite low (about £61,000 a year) for the job he was doing.

The Hutton inquiry proceeded for the second day on August 12, 2003. Both Andrew Gilligan and his colleague Susan Watts confirmed that Dr Kelly had mentioned the name of Mr Alastair Campbell to them in the relation to the September 2002 dossier in the course of the interviews they had with him. Susan Watts went as far as saying that Dr Kelly said that Alastair Campbell had "sexed-up" the dossier but she took the comment as a "gossipy aside" and she did not use it because she thought it was "glib and speculative". All the same there was no clear evidence yet that Mr Campbell inserted the claim that Iraq troops could use their weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of receiving the order. But it is now clear that Dr Kelly mentioned Mr Campbell's name while talking about the dossier. Dr Kelly denied this to his employers but he could have been motivated by fear for his career and reputation. The BBC suffered a bad blow when it was revealed that senior BBC editors and even members of the board of governors had serious concerns about Mr Gilligan's Iraq dossier stories. Especially his "loose use of language" during the May 29, 2003, Today programme was criticised. However the BBC maintained corporate unity in front of the government attacks.

On August 13, 2003, the third day of the Lord Hutton's inquiry we learned that:
- Dr Kelly thought that the government would not have convinced the British people of the need to go to war with Iraq without exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. The BBC journalist, Susan Watts, recorded this comment. According to Dr Kelly the concern was not the weapons Iraq had, but what it may be able to develop in the future.
- Dr Kelly also said that the government was desesperate for information in the shape they wanted but "they did not want to hear some of the things". He also added that he personally reviewed the whole dossier, whereas the government has said that he was only involved in the dossier's historical sections. Dr Kelly believed that the 45 minutes claim was kept in the dossier because of pressure from the Number 10 Press Office adding "I think Alastair Campbell is synonymous with that press office because he is responsible for it".
- Susan Watts, science editor of Newsnight, broke the united BBC front in the battle of the Iraq dossier stories. She denounced the BBC's "misguided and false" attempts to use her stories to corroborate Andrew Gilligan's controversial report. The BBC believed that her report backed up Gilligan's stories about Downing Street giving too much importance to the claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of the order being given. The top management believed, rightly, that both Susan Watts and Andrew Gilligan had used the same source. She was under pressure from the director of BBC news, Richard Sambrook, to reveal her source and she consulted independent lawyers. The BBC is paying their frrs. Susan Watts believed that her stories and Gilligan's differed in many ways: her report did not say that Downing Street had inserted the 45 minutes claim knowing it was false and she did not link the concerns of the Intelligence services to Alastair Campbell. She only allowed the BBC to reveal the name of her source, Dr Kelly, after his death. The BBC top managers knew that Susan Watts was angry and expected to make some criticism but not at that level. She will not be sacked because the corporation does not want to discourage other staff members from speaking out at any future inquiry.
- The BBC director of news, Richard Sambrook, denied that Susan Watts had been put under pressure and he still believe that they were more similarities than differences between the two reports. He revealed that he lunched with the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, at which he defended Gilligan's competence as a journalist.

On August 14, 2003, the Hutton inquiry heard that Tony Blair and his Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, intervened personally in the case of Dr Kelly. Mr Blair ordered that Dr Kelly should face a second round of questioning by senior officials of the Ministry of Defence about his contacts with the BBC journalist, Andrew Gilligan. Mr Hoon top official, Sir Kevin Tebbit, advised against letting Dr Kelly testify publicly to the Commons Select Foreign Affairs Committee (to "show some regards for the man who had come forward voluntarily and who is not used to being thrust into the public eye, and is not on trial") but Mr Hoon decided all the same that he should for "presentative reasons". Even John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, asked that Dr Kelly be given "a proper security style interview". This appearance seriously distressed Dr Kelly. Downing Street was informed of, and sometime directed, Dr Kelly's treatment, as they wanted to eliminate the impact of Gilligan's claims that No10 had "sexed-up" the dossier justifying the war in Iraq.

The first week of the Hutton inquiry showed:
- Intelligence officials shared Dr Kelly's doubts about the Iraq weapons dossier.
- Andrew Gilligan admitted that he had been wrong to say that the government had included the 45 minutes claim in the September 2002 dossier knowing that it was wrong.
- Internal documents show that BBC managers and governors had serious doubts about Gilligan's reporting techniques.
- Gilligan's report was broadly confirmed by what Dr Kelly told Susan Watts, also a BBC journalist.
- Dr Kelly told different things to different people. For instance he told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee that he was not Gilligan's source. Which he was. He denied talking to another BBC journalist, Gavin Hewitt, but he did. He denied briefing the BBC journalists against the government, which the Watts' tape shows he did. He denied being the source of the Observer June 15 article on chemical and biological weapons. He was.
- Tony Blair and Downing Street were directly involved in the handling of Dr Kelly.
- Politicians and civil servants disagreed on how to treat Dr Kelly. The Ministry of Defence Permanent Secretary, Kevin Tebbit, thought that Dr Kelly should not have testified to the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee. The Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, overruled him and agreed for Dr Kelly to testify.
- The Ministry of Defence hounded Dr Kelly in the days before his death threatening him with disciplinary actions.
- The September dossier was hardened up. This was showed when various drafts of the dossier were published by the inquiry.
Alastair Campbell had a passionate interest, close to obsession, with the BBC, as shown in various letters written by his office.

The Observer of August 17, 2003, tells us that Alastair Campbell will say to the Hutton Inquiry where he will appear in two days that he did not play any role in the "naming strategy" used to identify the BBC source, Dr Kelly. He will lay the blame on the Ministry of Defence and its Secretary of State Geoff Hoon adding that he only saw the strategy after it had been approved. Jonathan Powell, Blair's Chief of Staff, will do the same saying that this was the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.

On August 18, 2003, Downing Street Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, told the Hutton inquiry that he warned Tony Blair, Sir David manning, and Alastair Campbell one week before the September 24, 2002, dossier on Iraq that he would be wrong to claim that Iraq was a "imminent threat" to the west and even to its Arab neighbours. Obviously Blair did not follow the advice who, instead, told the Commons that Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction was "active, detailed, and growing … It is up and running now". It was also revealed that David Kelly, Blair's spokesman, sent an email that described the battle between the government and the BBC as a "game of chicken". On September 5, 2002, Alastair Campbell told Mr Powell that the dossier had to be rewritten to include "real intelligence". It was also clear to the inquiry that Blair and top Ministry of Defence officials wanted Dr Kelly to testify to the Intelligence and Security Committee both in private and in public, not caring for the intense personal pressure this interviews would out on Dr Kelly. Blair wanted to know in advance what Dr Kelly would possibly said and Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, warned that he could say "uncomfortable" things. In other words, Tony Blair and his closest advisers were involved personally in the events that led to Dr Kelly's death. James Dingemans QC, the senior council to the Hutton inquiry asked Mr Powell, the Downing Street Chief of Staff, "Was Dr Kelly really in the game of chickens as playing, or played with?" Powell's answer was "We were locked in confrontation and there was no way the BBC could gracefully climb out".

On August 20, 2003, Downing Street seemed to designate Geoff Hoon as the fall guy to the Hutton enquiry. Alastair Campbell blamed the Ministry of Defence's "naming strategy" that added fuel to the crisis. Mr Hoon will defend himself and protect his reputation but he has few friends left at the top level of the government as they do their best to save their career. Dr Kelly was made to appear in front of the Intelligence and Foreign Affairs committees to undermine the BBC story. As for the claim that the Iraqi could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order, Campbell said "I had no input, output, influence upon it whatever at any stage in the process". According to him the Intelligence Services put the claim in the dossier.

On August 20, 2003, two Downing Street officials -Godric Smith and Tom Kelly, the Prime Minister's spokesmen- said that, on July 7, Alastair Campbell wanted to leak details about Dr Kelly to a well-chosen newspaper two days before his name was revealed. The spokesmen advised against the move designed to avoid embarrassment to Blair. Dr Kelly's name became known on July 9. Downing Street was involved in the strategy even if it denied it. Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Ministry of Defence's Permanent Secretary, told the inquiry that he learned of the Prime Minister's involvement in following closely the events on July 4.

On August 21, 2003, the Hutton inquiry was told of a conversation Dr Kelly had with the British Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Switzerland, David Broucher, in February this year. In it Dr Kelly said that the UN weapons inspectors could get a good idea of what arms were in dotation to the Iraqi army and which one had been destroyed. He added that he told his Iraqi contact that if they complied with the Weapons inspectors' demands, Iraq would not be invaded. He thought that if he was wrong, then he would appear to be a liar and a betrayer in the eyes of the Iraqis. Broucher asked him what would happen then and Dr Kelly's answer chilled the room "I would probably found dead in the woods". In addition Lord Hutton was also told that Dr Kelly:
- Confirmed that there had been a long debate between Downing Street and the Intelligence services about the September dossier.
- Expressed doubts that Iraq could deploy its weapons quickly.
- Had been in direct contact with senior Iraqi scientists and officials, telling them that war could be stopped.
- That he had betrayed these contacts and that the invasion had left him in a difficult moral position.
- Was shocked to be named as the source of Gilligan's report after being told that he would remain anonymous.
A government memo showed that Mr Hoon tried to forbid him to talk about weapons of mass destruction during his appearance before the Common Select Foreign Affairs Committee.

Also on August 21, 2003, it became known that Andrew Gilligan gave Dr Kelly's name on July 14 -while the BBC was refusing to name Gilligan's source- to two MPs on a Commons committee investigating his allegations, the Liberal Democrat David Chidgey and the Conservative Richard Ottaway. The emails were sent the day before Dr Kelly's deposition before the Commons Select Foreign Affairs Committee. At the same time it is rumoured that Alastair Campbell could be recalled before the same committee. Conservative MP John Maples accused him of misleading the committee because he told it that he had suggested 11 changes to the September dossier instead of the 15 as revealed in a letter to Sir John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

On August 24, 2003, The Observer said that Tony Blair agreed to the strategy that led to Dr Kelly being named. He believed that it was impossible to keep his name secret. He approved "making public that a source had come forward" but the way to do it was left to the Ministry of Defence. John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee agreed too.

The Observer of August 24, 2003, revealed that Dr Kelly faced arrest over the BBC leak a few weeks before his death after a police inquiry into a second leak to the BBC Today programme for which he was a suspect. The government scientist was named as the possible source of document given to Gilligan. A secret document revealed that the intelligence services did not believe there were links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida. Andrew Gilligan ran a report on this base in February 2003 and Dr Kelly was suspected for being his source but he was cleared. Later on Dr Kelly thought that including the 45 minutes claim in the September dossier on the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was wrong. This back Gilligan's claim that Dr Kelly told him of his doubts on the subject.

Andrew Gilligan has been removed from reporting duty for the duration of the Hutton inquiry according to The Observer of August 24, 2003.

On August 24, 2003, Andrew Gilligan sent another document to the Hutton inquiry in which he tells Lord Hutton that, after sending his email, he contacted one of the two MPs to tell him that he could not be certain that Dr Kelly was Susan Watts' source. His credibility is going down the drain even if some evidence support his claim that Downing Street exaggerated the threat presented by Saddam Hussein. But the publication of his email to two MPs on the Commons foreign affairs committee briefing them on what to ask Dr Kelly did not do him any good. He did not inform the BBC executives of this and they are refusing to back him up on some issues. He also told them to Dr Kelly talked to Susan Watts of Newsnight. It is true that Dr Kelly was the source but it was not known at that time. It was also revealed that Richard Sambrook, the head of BBC News was ready to move Gilligan from the Today programme to appease the government while the BBC top directors defended and backed him.

On August 24, 2003, we were told that Dr Kelly's widow, Janice Kelly, demanded who in the government was running a smear campaign against her dead husband, leaking information against him in order to turn public opinion against him. This she did after Tom Kelly, Blair's spokesman, said that Dr Kelly was a "Walter Mitty" character. She will testify to the Hutton inquiry and it is probable that it will be damaging to the government. At the same time the government is being accused of failing to give some documents to the Hutton inquiry. These include, among many others, three pages of the executive summary issued under Blair's name of the September 16, 2002, version of the dossier to be published 8 days later.

On August 26, 2003, the main witness called by the Hutton inquiry was Mr John Scarlett, chairman of the Intelligence Committee. As we were told by the BBC, Mr Scarlett served his government and his country in many capitals of the world and on this day he served them in London by denying that Mr Alastair Campbell had anything to do with the content of the September 2002 Iraq dossier. He insisted that he was fully responsible for its content and that Downing Street interfered only on the presentation and not on the content. In particular the mention that the Iraqi could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order was his responsibility based on what was a well-known and qualified source (a high level Iraqi). However written documents released show that Downing Street put pressure on the intelligence services to come up with a dossier as strong as possible. Mr Scarlett denied that some senior members of the intelligence services were unhappy with the final version of the dossier; it is true that some were not happy with intelligence assessments being made public.

On August 27, 2003, the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, appeared before the Hutton inquiry. He did not give a very good impression as he tried his best to shift the responsibility on others, including Tony Blair, Alastair Campbell, Jonathan Powell, Sir Kevin Tebbit, etc. He undermined Downing Street's defence by insisting that Blair's key officials were deeply involved in the "naming strategy" of Dr Kelly and his death. He gave the impression that he did not really know what was going on in his ministry; every else did know but not him or he was told after the decisions had been taken.

On August 28, 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared before the Hutton inquiry. Some people spent the night on the pavement to have access to the 10 seats reserved to the public in the courtroom or, as second best, to be able to see the whole proceeding on big television screen in a room next door. He is the second prime minister to be called in front of such an inquiry (the first one was John Major). Tony Blair offered a very good show, he was very convincing but this was just talk trying to hide the real truth about the Iraqi war: that it was decided months in advance between him and President Bush and all the talk and documents to justify it did not mean anything. It is quite possible that Downing Street did not add the famous reference to the 45 minutes delay for the Iraqi to launch weapons of mass destruction The main point is that after 4 months of occupying Iraq the US and Britain were not able to find any traces of such weapons. In other words, we have been lied to or the intelligence services of both countries were totally incompetent and it is up to each of us to decide what is the worst. One thing is certain, France, Germany, Russia, and China were right to be against this war. In short Blair said that nor him nor Alastair Campbell were responsible for this 45 minutes sentence in the September 2002 report and that the BBC was quite wrong not to accept his word for it; he said that he would have resigned if he was responsible for it; he admitted that he was involved in the "naming strategy" of Dr Kelly; he said that he wondered for some time about how to handle the Dr Kelly's affair in order to avoid accusation of cover-up; he admitted that the "dossier" was part of a strategy decided with President Bush; unlike Geoff Hoon yesterday, Blair admitted his responsibilities and defended his colleagues. Gavyn Davis, the chairman of the BBC Board of governors, appeared before the Hutton inquiry after Tony Blair. He defended the actions of the BBC and its autonomy. He blamed Mr Campbell for the strong words used before the Commons Select Foreign Affairs Committee against the BBC. He was trying to cool down the debate but Mr Campbell re-ignited it by putting in doubt the impartiality and integrity of the BBC. He insisted that the BBC was only reporting the views of a senior, credible and reliable source -who finally was named as being Dr Kelly- but was not making the allegations.

On August 30, 2003, the media told us that Dr Kelly's widow, Janice Kelly, asked to make her deposition to the Hutton inquiry by video link to avoid public contact. Other members of the Kelly's family will also testify including his daughter, Rachel, and Dr Kelly's sister, Sarah Pape, and other friends.

On September 1, 2003, Dr Kelly's widow, Janice, his sister and his daughter, Rachel, appeared before the Hutton inquiry. Mrs Kelly made her deposition by video link from a room nearby in the court of justice, as she did not want to do it in public. Mrs Kelly defended the memory of her death husband saying that making his name public -after he had been told that he would not be revealed- broke his heart and made him utterly unhappy, let down and betrayed. She added that his employers put him in a nightmare because he was afraid that he would loose his job and his pension. To escape the media they left their home for a few days, first going to Weston-Super-Mare then to Cornwall. Mrs Kelly put some doubts in the truthfulness of the depositions given by Tony Blair and some of his closest advisers over the Whitehall strategy that let his name known to the media. Her husband's immediate line manager and some more senior officials of the Ministry of Defence had told him that no press statement would be released. His daughter, Rachel, recalled that her father turned pale when it was mentioned that Alastair Campbell was also involved after he admitted talking to Andrew Gilligan. Dr Kelly's sister, Sarah Page, a consultant plastic surgeon, said that her brother did not show any suicidal signs in the days before his death or in the months before.

On September 3, 2003, the Hutton inquiry heard from professor Keith Hawton, a leading British authority on suicide, that most probably Dr Kelly killed himself due to the escalating pressure from the Ministry of Defence and the MPs. The prospect of a humiliating end to his career and, perhaps loosing his pension rights, were too much for him. He also realised that he would be taken off his present job due to the fact that his employer had lost trust in him. He was also a man who could not share his problems and feelings with anyone else. Professor Hawton also added that it would have been impossible for most people to foresee that Dr Kelly was going to commit suicide.

The people who discovered Dr Kelly's body on the morning of July 18 were also interviewed by the Hutton inquiry on September 2, 2003. They said that in the afternoon of July 17 he went to an isolated beauty spot not far from his home, walked about 150 meters in woodland and committed suicide. His body was discovered by a trained dog slumped against a tree. Near him were a three-inch pruning knife, his cap, wristwatch and a bottle of water that he used to swallow about 30 painkilling drug tablets. His left arm was covered with blood. There were no signs of a struggle, he was pronounced dead at 10.07 am, his family was informed and his home searched. No note explaining why he committed suicide was found.

On September 3, 2003, Dr Brian Jones, the ex-head of the defence intelligence staff's section analysing evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq appeared before the Hutton inquiry. What he said was not very nice for the government:
- Iraq's weapons capacity was not accurately represented in the September 2002 dossier. According to him Iraq had not such weapons, at least in large quantity.
- The 45-minute claim was incorrect and other claims were "over-egged".
- Complaints from experts in the field were ignored after Downing Street "shutters" came down.
Dr Jones was a senior government intelligence official who was involved in the production of the dossier. The claim that the Iraqi army could launch their weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of receiving an order to do it came from a single and "secondary" source whose purpose could have been to "influence rather that inform" the British.

The first part of the Hutton inquiry ended on September 4, 2003. The second phase will start on September 15 when some previous and new people will be asked to appear before it. A new released document shows that the "ownership" of the September 24, 2002, dossier was not in the hands of the Joint Intelligence Committee and its chairman, John Scarlett, but that Downing Street was in fact the leader. This contradicts what Blair said to Lord Hutton. Lord Hutton said that the fact of recalling a witness does not mean that he thinks he or she is guilty of anything.

On September 4, 2003, Olivia Boasch, a close friend to Dr Kelly and a former Unscom inspector in Iraq, said that Dr Kelly denied giving the name of Alastair Campbell to Andrew Gilligan. According to her the BBC journalist played a "name-game" to discover who put the "45 minutes" reference in the dossier. Alastair Campbell was the first name mentioned by Gilligan. Dr Kelly also told her that he was surprised that Gilligan was determined to put the blame on someone.

The Hutton inquiry stopped working for 10 days on September 4, 2003. At that stage we know that:
- Dr Kelly was a complex and close person, enthusiastic for his work but uncommunicative in his private life.
- It is quite certain that Dr Kelly killed himself having come under strong pressure in public.
- Downing Street took seriously the BBC's report that it had inserted the 45 minutes claim in the Iraq dossier knowing it was wrong.
- Downing Street wanted Dr Kelly's name to become public to help their case against the BBC.
- Tony Blair was personally involved in the naming strategy of Dr Kelly.
- The Iraq dossier of weapons of mass destruction was strongly exaggerated.
- The claim that Iraq could deploy its weapons of mass destruction came from a dubious second-hand source.
- There were disagreements within the intelligence services over the wording of the dossier.
- Geoff Hoon did not tell the whole truth to the inquiry.
- Andrew Gilligan's story that Downing Street wanted to "sex-up" its Iraq dossier has been shown to be correct. His claim that Downing Street inserted the 45-minute claim knowing that it was not true has not been confirmed.

On September 10, 2003, The Evening Standard said that they had seen an advance copy of the final report of the Intelligence and Security Committee on Iraq. Apparently the report criticises Geoff Hoon the Defence Secretary for not telling them the truth about dissent within his department about Saddam Hussein weapons. The report will be published on September 11 but if the leak is telling the truth then Hoon's career is in jeopardy. Let us wait for the report.

On September 11, 2003, a document was released that seems to back-up the statement made by Geoff Hoon that Dr Kelly was told in advance that a press statement would reveal that an Ministry of Defence official had admitted talking to Andrew Gilligan. Dr Kelly would have to the Intelligence and Security Committee of the Commons "The official Ministry of Defence statement -saying that an unnamed official had admitted talking to Gilligan- was made up with my agreement". This is exactly the opposite of what his widow told the Hutton inquiry.

Lord Hutton called four new witnesses on September 12, 2003. They will appear before his inquiry on September 15. Among them we have:
- The BBC director general, Greg Dyke who probably will be interrogated on his role on the battle between the BBC and the government over the Iraq dossier story. Mr Dyke is in fact the editor-in-chief of all the BBC programmes.
- Air Marshall Sir Joe French, chief of Defence Intelligence. He was aware of the concerns, shared by Dr Kelly, about the terms used at the time the September 2002 dossier was written.
- Tony Cragg, deputy chief of Defence Intelligence at the time, for the same reasons as above. He also received a letter from Bryan Jones, and senior analyst working under him, who expressed his own critics on the dossier.

On September 15, 2003, the head of MI6, Sir Richard Billing Dearlove, known as "C", testified by audio link to the Hutton inquiry. It is probably not his real name and his latest known photograph dates from 1963. It is the first time that a head of MI6 testifies to any inquiry. He was shocked that Dr Kelly discussed a secret intelligence report (they are known as "CX") with the press. For him it was "a serious breach of discipline". He said that the reference to the 45 minutes claim did not bring any negative comment from the intelligence experts (described as "customers") who have access to the CX documents although the information came from a single, but reliable, source. However he added that the 45 minutes claim had been "misinterpreted" and the consequent criticisms by the MPs were valid. The BBC General Director criticised Andrew Gilligan sending emails to MPs with suggestions of questions to be asked to Dr Kelly when he appeared before a Commons committee.

Starting September 16, 2003, the Hutton inquiry will recall the first of the 16 witnesses he is recalling for a second grilling. It is clear from their list that Lord Hutton will focus on the compilation of the September 2002 Iraq weapons dossier justifying invading Iraq. Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, John Scarlett, the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Alastair Campbell, Andrew Gilligan and the BBC Chairman, Gavyn Davis, will be among those recalled.

On September 16, 2003, The Guardian revealed that a third Ministry of Defence intelligence analyst expressed concern on September 17, 2002, that the wording of the September 2002 Iraq dossier published on September 24, 2002, had been exaggerated. This result from a confidential Ministry of Defence memo sent to the Hutton inquiry. The analyst whose name was not revealed, did not believe that Iraq had continued producing chemical and biological weapons and that these could be ready for use within 45 minutes. However Mr Cragg, former deputy chief of defence intelligence, and Air Marshall Sir Joe French, the former head of defence intelligence staff, said that the dossier was serious and well prepared and that he was content with its final wording.

On September 16, the 17th day of the Hutton inquiry, lawyers for the Dr Kelly's family (Jeremy Gompertz, QC), for the BBC (Andrew Caldecott, QC) and for the government (Jonathan Sumption, one of the most expensive QC) were able to cross-examine witnesses and this they did very strongly. Dr Kelly's family seems to be angry at the way the Ministry of Defence and Downing Street named Dr Kelly to the media. Their lawyer grilled Martin Howard, the deputy chief of defence intelligence, on this question and described Dr Kelly's naming as "Russian roulette". The BBC lawyer interrogated Mr Howard on the possible discontent within the intelligences services about the Iraq dossier. A pathologist, Nicholas hunt, said that Dr Kelly died between 16.15 on July 17, 2003, and 01.15 on July 18. He did not find any trace of third party involvement and he believes that the injuries were self-inflicted. The BBC lawyer said that dissent within the intelligence services were hidden from the MPs with Mr Blair telling the Commons on June 4, 2003, that the allegations of discontent were "completely and totally untrue". It is now well known that two or three senior intelligence officials disagree with the language used, as well as the 45 minutes claim, and even put them in writing. In particular Dr Brian Jones said that "the shutters came down" and he wrote to his chief, Martin Howard, about his doubts. Martin Howard advised Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, not to mention these complaints. As a result the government misled the MPS and the Foreign Affairs Committee.

On September 17, 2003, on Day 18, the Hutton inquiry interviewed Andrew Gilligan and his chief, Mr Richard Sambrook, for the second time. Mr Gilligan defended his "ToDay programme" report, although he admitted that he made some mistakes justified, in part, because his reports were not edited and by slip of the tongue, usual when reporting is made in direct. One slip of the tongue, he said was when he accused the government to have put into their September 2002 Iraq report that the Iraqis could launch weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes knowing that this was "wrong". What he meant was that this information, which came from a single source, was "unreliable". He also admitted that his description of Dr Kelly in one of his broadcast as being a "senior intelligence source" was incorrect. He also apologised for telling MPs from the Foreign Affairs committee which questions to ask to Dr Kelly and naming Dr Kelly as Ms Susan watts' source for her programme. In fact he did not know at the time who her source was. His chief, Mr Sambrook, said that Gilligan did not use the "nuances and subtleties" of broadcasting journalism. He added that Gilligan made an error of judgement by emailing MPs members of the Foreign Affairs Committee suggesting questions to ask Dr Kelly. He believes that Gilligan is very good at finding information but not in reporting them. In other words, the BBC is letting Gilligan down and alone. Later on the Ministry of Defence head of personnel, Richard Hatfield admitted that Dr Kelly was not asked if he agreed before his name was made public adding that "there was no need to give him a veto" on this question. Its naming was the result of his talking in the way he did with BBC journalists.

On September 18, 2003, on Day 19 of the Hutton Inquiry, the personnel director of the Ministry of Defence, Richard Hatfield, blamed Dr Kelly for not telling him of his contacts with the BBC journalists, Andrew Gilligan, Susan watts and possibly others. He added that if he had known what he now knows, he would have had to suspend Dr Kelly for "fundamental failings". Mr Hatfield also said that the pressure he came under was a direct consequence of his talking in the way he did with journalists and that he should have informed his wife of what was going on to prepare her for the stress to which she was later subjected. He asked Dr Kelly to state publicly that he talked to Andrew Gilligan, but that the journalist embellished his criticism of the government Iraqi dossier. Dr Kelly refused. Mr Hatfield believes that the Ministry of Defence treated Dr Kelly well. A computer expert told the inquiry that there were two records in Gilligan's computer of the notes he took while he interviewed Dr Kelly and that the name of Alastair Campbell appeared only in the second. Gilligan denied he had tampered with his computer and explained the anomalies by saying that he "saved" his notes twice and that the computer clock was wrong giving the impression that the second recording had been done the next day, which was not the case, both were made during the interview. Mr Campbell's name appeared only in the second record because his name was mentioned at the end of the interview! We will see later on what to make of it after experts analyse in full. We were also told that lord Hutton report would not be ready until November.

In the week starting on September 22, 2003, some major players will be recalled before the Hutton inquiry and they will not have an easy time. John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, will be accused of letting intelligence being "politicised" to suit the decision of Downing Street to invade Iraq. Alastair Campbell will have to explain why he required 15 changes to the dossier, hardening it, and even changing the title. His role in making Dr Kelly's name public will also be mentioned. Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, and Sir Kevin Tebbit, the permanent secretary, will be accused of failing in their duty of care in relation to Dr Kelly.

On September 21, 2003, the BBC tried to limit the negative effects of the Hutton report by reorganising. Andrew Gilligan will certainly loose his job as Defence correspondent on the Today programme. The best he can hope is to be moved somewhere else, the worse would be for him to be dismissed but this is not likely. The BBC will also be changing the way it deals with complaints, making it more transparent. BBC journalists and managers will also be told to admit mistakes when it is the case. The future of the news director, Richard Sambrook will also depend on the conclusions of Lord Hutton. However he is looking more and more like a fall guy for other people mistakes.

On September 22, 2003, Geoff Hoon and Alastair Campbell appeared for the second time before the Hutton inquiry. Their depositions were often at odd in relation to the naming of Dr Kelly. Hoon, at some point, said that he did not know that his name was leaked or even was going to be leaked while Campbell's diary said that Hoon wanted it to be given to the press. In all this Hoon appears to be a liar and Campbell a man who wanted to hit the BBC hard at all cost.

The Hutton inquiry heard on September 23, 2003, that Downing Street's chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, asked the Joint Intelligence Committee to rewrite parts of the September 24, 2002, Iraq dossier, to make it appear that Saddam Hussein's threat what greater that they knew it was. He required that the dossier should make it clear that Saddam had plans to use chemical and biological weapons against the west. This request did appear as such in the final dossier that said "intelligence indicate that Saddam is willing to use such weapons also against its Shia population" before mentioning that they could be deployed in 45 minutes. This request was to show that Saddam was not only a defensive, but also an offensive threat. Tom Kelly, Blair's spokesman, admitted that Downing Street released biographical details about Dr Kelly in an effort to undermine the BBC. He added that this was the only way to challenge the BBC that on July 8, 2003, gave the false impression that Dr Kelly was not the BBC source. At that time Dr Kelly had not been named.

The last witnesses appeared before the Hutton inquiry on September 24, 2003. Dr Kelly's line manager, Brian wells, had to admit that he told him that his name was to be given to the media in a 46-second phone call made from a train. Wells also gave the impression that panic and buck-passing was in full swing in the Ministry of Defence, Whitehall and Downing Street. The government did not come out of it very well at all. On the same day Gavyn Davies, the Chairman of the BBC board of governors defended his position in refusing to back down from the controversy with the government.

On September 25, 2003, the Hutton inquiry heard the final statements of the lawyers involved. QC Jeremy Gompertz for the Kelly family attacked the government, that did not accept any criticism while the BBC did, and especially, Geoff Hoon, the defence Secretary, and his officials for the way they treated Dr Kelly. He accused them of duplicity and abuse of power. He accused Richard Hatfield, the Defence Ministry director of personnel, of arrogance and that his description of the way they handled Dr Kelly as outstanding, in his opinion was "risible". Dr Kelly's own views were considered "irrelevant" and he hoped that "Never again should there be such feeble support for an employee in time of crisis". Of course, Andrew Gilligan and the BBC in general were also the objects of his complaints. The government layer, QC Jonathan Sumption, did his best to make it appears that the government did not do any mistakes in the process and behaved honourably. He did not accept any criticism.

On September 27, 2003, The Guardian told us of the 10 ways used by the government to sex-up the Iraqi dossier in September 2002:
- Change its title from "Iraq's Programme for WMD" to "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction".
- Harden the prime Minister foreword.
- Change "could be" to "are deployable"
- Edit out references that reduce the Iraqi threat
- Alastair Campbell suggests inserting a phrase to make the dossier "Stronger".
- Campbell suggests changing "could" to "capable of".
- Harden the nuclear threat.
- Fail to correct media misrepresentation of the 45-minutes claim.
- Intensify the threat to British forces by adding a reference to Cyprus.
- Remove phrases that imply Saddam's intent is defensive rather than offensive.

The Hutton inquiry met again on October 13, 2003, to interview the last witness, Sir Kevin Tebbit the Ministry of Defence Permanent Secretary, who could not come before because he was in hospital for an eye operation. Sit Kevin said that the decisions that led to revealing the name of Dr Kelly to the media were taken at Downing Street on July 2003, the day before the name of the scientist was made public, in a meeting chaired by Tony Blair with Alastair Campbell, Jonathan Powell and John Scarlett present. The meeting also approved a question and answer paper telling the Ministry of Defence should tell the media. Until now Blair always said that he did not take the decision. Nobody from the Ministry of Defence participated in the meeting. He also confirmed that Dr Kelly was never asked if he agreed to have his name made public.

On January 28, 2004, Lord Hutton presented his report in London on the death of Dr Kelly. First he said that Dr Kelly committed suicide and that no other person was involved in his death. He went on clearing Tony Blair and the government of any wrongdoing in the death of Dr Kelly adding that they did not attempt to deceive the Parliament and the British people about the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and by "sexing-up" the September 2002 dossier. On the other hand he blamed the BBC for all the problems. According to him the report by the BBC journalist Gilligan of May 20, 2003, asserting the government knew that there was no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, was "unfounded"; he castigated the BBC for "sloppy" reporting and "defecting" editorial supervision. As a result the chairman of the BBC's Board of Governors, Gavyn Davies, resigned and he was followed the next day by the General Director, Greg Dyke. This was the worst journalistic debacle in the 78-year history of the BBC. However, many observers immediately put in doubt Lord Hutton's conclusions. There is no doubt that the BBC and some of its journalists made mistakes, but so did the government. As a newspaper said this is "political whitewash". On January 2 the acting president of the board of governors, Lord Ryder, issued a shameful complete apologies to the government and Blair accepted them with a smile. Hundred of BBC employees all over Britain walked off their job and asked for Dyke's return. However Mark Byford, a senior BBC executive, was immediately named acting director general. But a backlash was soon developing especially among the BBC supporters who saw the Hutton report as completely bias in favour of the government. Even rightwing newspapers, such as the Daily Mail, that do not especially like the BBC, came to its defence. This will hurt the BBC especially outside the UK. It is pure whitewash to cover the government's mistakes.

On January 30, 2004, the BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan, the man at the centre of the dispute between the BBC and the British government, resigned. In a radio transmission at 06.00 on May 29 2003, Gilligan implied that Blair government "probably knew" that the information contained in their September 2002 dossier justifying the invasion of Iraq, were false and that it had "sexed up" the report to bolster their case for going to war. Lord Hutton said that all Gilligan said was wrong and that the British government was blameless. Nobody believes Lord Hutton's conclusions and see his conclusions as "white wash".

On January 31, 2004, a BBC dossier showed clearly that Lord Hutton's conclusions were far less than perfect. In fact the majority of the British people found it "flawed", one-sided, a whitewash of the government and did not take into consideration any of the BBC evidences. Obviously Blair chose the right person, an old judge who was knighted although he was involved in all the well-known cover-up that occurred in North Ireland, a member of the establishment who would never admit the government that treated him well, could be doing anything wrong. It is a good example of what Lords -even appointed- are alike. His report is worthless from all points of views and it is a shame that another one of them -Lord Ryder, the acting chairman of the board of governors- apologised without reserve to the government. After all, he was already a commissioner at the time and as such responsible for what the BBC did wrongly -if anything- and he should have resigned too. The BBC staffs is turning against Lord Ryder and some big-name journalists are threatening to leave to protest against the way the acting chairman is acting and especially for his abject public apologising. Big names like Joan Bakewell, Ben Brown, Gavin Esler, Jonathan Ross, John Simpson and Jeremy Vine were among 10,000 BBC employees who backed a newspaper advert yesterday, expressing "dismay" at the loss of Dyke and vowing to "search for truth". Now we are given a list of candidates for the BBC chairman's job. The leading candidate seems to be Christ Patten, now an European commissioner but others such as Lord Puttnam, Michael Grade, John Bird and Michael Portillo.

On February 1, 2004, the Observer asked the following question: "Are we all mad, or is it Hutton". The majority of the British people believes that the law lord's finding contradict the evidence he heard. Now it looks that process that vindicated Tony Blair, Alastair Campbell, the intelligence services and Whitehall could become a bigger problem for the government that is seen as lying by an angry public.

On February 1, 2004, the BBC was under shock, the staffs was more and more angry and the former General Director, Greg Dyke revealed that the governors forced him out and that he did not intend to go quietly. Dyke also accused the government of" systematic bullying and intimidation" during the war in Iraq; even Blair complained to Dyke about the BBC war coverage. He is considering hiring lawyers to ask for a judicial review of the Hutton inquiry as he believe the Hutton report was one sided and moreover that Lord Hutton misinterpreted the law that allows a journalist to defend a story that turn out to be inaccurate if its publication was in the public interest. Senior BBC journalists are asking the acting chairman, Lord Ryder, to resign after his public apology. Andrew Gilligan insisted that it was correct to say that the government had exaggerated its Iraq war dossier. Ministers are rightly alarmed at the scale of the BBC rebellion and its public support. At the same time the support for Blair's government and the Labour party is decreasing because the public wants an independent BBC and believe that they are against it.

On February 4, 2004, Lord Birt, the general diector before Greg Dyke and now a Downing Street adviser, attacked the BBC board of directors for endorsing slipshot journalism. It accused the corporation of "blind defence and sophistry" implying that if he would still have been at the BBC this would not have happened although he was not very popular among the staff. The BBC is now trying to blame Andrew Gilligan for all the mistakes in the Iraq dossier story showing again that the new chairma, Lord Ryder, has no backbone. They intend to call him a "rogue reporter who went off piste" during the 06.07 radio broadcast on May 29, 2003.

On February 5, 2004, the BBC announced that it was renouncing to mount a legal challenge to the Hutton report as it believe that if even the BBC won it, it would only make matters worse in the long run.

On February 6, 2004, the British government through Lord Falconer, the Lord Chancellor, admitted that the use of the "20 questions" name guessing-game used to identify Dr David Kelly to the media was wrong and will not be used anymore in the future. He admitted that it would have been better if the name had been given by a press release at a time agreed with Dr Kelly. A little late for Dr Kelly.

On January 17, 2004, Geoff Hoon the British Defence Secretary said that Dr Kelly was no martyr and that he killed himself because he feared exposure as a liar. He was, in fact, obliged to come clean about the extent of his unauthorised contacts with journalists. Dr Kelly had been asked to produce a full list of his contact with journalists and he was working on it on July 17 2003, the day he killed himself. Hoon is ready to resign if the Hutton report criticise him. He added that the "affair" has negative effects on the morale of the key people in his department.

Finally, on February 29, 2004, the BBC top journalists started to react to the shameful apologies to the government given by the acting Chairman of the Board, Lord Ryder, and the Director General, Mark Byford, following the Hutton report. Their position is becoming more and more difficult every day. John Simpson, the BBC World Affairs editor has drafted a note to the board of governors asking it to stop an internal disciplinary investigation and demanding them to stop apologising for the David Kelly affair. John Humphrys, Andrew Marr and Jeremy Paxman support the move. Richard Sambrook, the director of news, Stephen Mitchell, the head of radio news, and George Entwisle, the editor of Newsnight are currently investigated. On March 3 Lord Hutton said that he was surprised that the top two BBC men resigned (as well as Gillihan) and that his report was seen as a "whitewash" of the government by the media. He is too modest or too stupid: everybody saw it as a whitewash starting from Blair, Campbell, the BBC people down to all the British people. It is a shame and nothing else.

On March 11, 2004, it was revealed that Lord Burn, Chairman of the Abbey bank and adviser to the government on the future of the BBC could become the next chairman of its board. Lord Burn is a friend of Lord Birt, the former BBC General Director. If he is nominated there will be allegations of cronyism as he is close to the prime minister.

On March 16, 2004, the Oxfordshire coroner, Nicholas Gardiner, refused to open his own inquiry into the circumstances of the death of Dr David Kelly. He declared that he was satisfied with Lord Hutton's conclusion that the scientist took his own life but cutting his left wrist and bleeding to death. The Kelly family agreed with the decision but a group of scientist went on saying that Dr Kelly was killed and that doubts about the cause of his death will remain for ever. Another whitewash?

On March 20, 2004, we learned that an internal disciplinary procedure in relation to the David Kelly affair and the following Hutton report is going on in the BBC. Many people at different levels are involved and the mood in the organisation is becoming bad and some of the members of the staff are already consulting lawyers.

On April 2, 2004, Michael Grade became the new BBC chairman. Mr Grade has worked most of his life in the media business having been chairman of Channel Four where he was known as "Pornographer-in-chief". He is replacing Gavyn Davies who resigned, together with Greg Dyke, following the disdainful Hutton report.

On April 14, 2004, Greg Dyke the former general director of BBC that was ousted following the disgraceful Hutton report could be hired by ITV as chief executive. This would be a shame for the so-called new BBC.

On May 10, 2004, an internal BBC inquiry put all the blames for the bad consequences of the Hutton report on Andrew Gilligan, the journalist at the base of the inquiry who has already resigned. The BBC also criticised Lord Hutton's report as misleading and flawed. They could have added that it was also a whitewash of the government's faults. Mr Richard Sambrook, the director of news, and Stephen Whittle, the head of editorial policy, are blamed but without consequence. This should close the BBC internal disciplinary inquiry.

On May 13, 2004, Lord Hutton defended his narrow verdict in the inquiry of the death of Dr David Kelly. He still insists that only the BBC was wrong and the government, right. He rejected the accusation that his report was whitewashing the government. He must be very lonely in his environment.

The new BBC Chairman, Michael Grade, chose the BBC general director on May 21, 2004. Mark Thompson, the chief executive of Channel 4 television will succeed to Greg Dyke who, together with the previous chairman, had to resign following the shameful Lord Hutton report. The BBC should be able to forget the past from now on.

On July 5, 2004, Gavyn Davies, the former BBC chairman, denounced the government for doing a "witch hunt" against the BBC last year and putting "intolerable pressure" on the corporation during the row over Andrew Gilligan's Iraq dossier. He also said that Downing Street discredited the weapon expert, Dr David Kelly, to save their faces. Most people, with the exception of Tony Blair and the man who whitewashed him, Lord Hutton, agree with Mr Davies.

On July 6, 2004, the senior BBC legal adviser, Glenn del Medico, said that, in his opinion, the Hutton report "biased" in favour of the government. He added that he would have cleared Andrew Gilligan's story for broadcasting if he has been consulted.

On July 6, 2004, the senior BBC legal adviser, Glenn del Medico, said that, in his opinion, the Hutton report "biased" in favour of the government. He added that he would have cleared Andrew Gilligan's story for broadcasting if he has been consulted.

On July 16, 2004, the British government was under fire over claims it failed to inform last year's Hutton inquiry that key Iraq weapons intelligence was flawed. Downing Street said the piece of intelligence in question fell outside Lord Hutton's remit. Tony Blair did not know it had been discredited when he gave evidence even though MI6 had taken what is regarded as the unusual step of withdrawing the intelligence as "unreliable". Mr Blair only learned that detail more recently "as a result of the Butler inquiry". The revelations have added to pressure for a further inquiry into the political decisions that led up to war.

On July 22, 2004, the new BBC General Director, Mark Thompson, removed Richard Sambrook from his job as director of news and pushed him side way as director of BBC World Service. Mr Sambrook was the last man to suffer from the Hutton report who "white washed" the government and blamed instead the BBC for the Gilligan's report that was finally shown to be right in the whole by Lord Butler. Mr Sambrook was doing a good job as director of news but the new BBC management is bending down lower that that the ground floor to please the government. It is also noticeable that the quality of the BBC news is going down the drain with the journalists careful not to say anything controversial It is sad, because the BBC was known for saying things as they were, not as the government wanted them to be seen. It is not the case anymore. Mrs Helen Boaden, the Radio 4 controller, will replace Mr Sambrook.

On August 29, 2004, the BBC's former director general Greg Dyke has made a scathing attack on Downing Street over the Iraq war and its treatment of the BBC. In the Mail on Sunday, Mr Dyke accuses Tony Blair of either being incompetent or lying to Parliament about the war in Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. It comes as Mr Dyke publishes his memoirs, Inside Story, in which he claims the prime minister tried to bully the BBC. Downing Street refused to comment in detail on the claims in Mr Dyke's book.