13.3
The role of the British Intelligence (!) services
-
On June 16, 2003, the head of MI5, Mrs Eliza Manningham-Buller, said that renegade
scientists (probably Pakistani) had provided al-Qaida with technological knowledge
in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. According to this British intelligence
service, it is only a matter of time before an attack is launched against a
western city using one of these weapons.
- On June 19, 2003, the British Foreign Affairs Committee called Alistair Campbell
to explain his role in the preparation of the intelligence dossier that was
used to persuade the public to back up the invasion of Iraq. Campbell could
refuse, but the committee could ask the parliament to summon him. Mr Campbell
is scheduled to speak to the Foreign affairs committee on June 25.
- Dr Ibrahim al-Marashi, the former Iraqi PhD student whose thesis was used
by the British government demanded an apology from the British authorities because
his life and that of his family had been endangered by Downing Street's use
of his material. He added that Downing Street had perverted his work to imply
that Iraq was backing terrorist groups outside Iraq, whereas he only said that
Iraq was supporting "foreign opposition group". Britain changed a
few words to suggest that Iraq was supporting al-Qaida.
- On June 24, the Foreign secretary, Jack Straw, appeared before the committee.
He admitted that the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was very
bad and incorrect. He denied being responsible for it. He added Mr Campbell,
and perhaps Mr Blair, were responsible for its content. He was also at great
pain to answer the obvious question, whether the reference to the 45 minutes
delay for the Iraqis to use their weapons of mass destruction was in the first
draft of the document written by the intelligence services. His answer let it
known that it was added later, but he refused to answer the question by a "yes"
or a "no" preferring confusing the issue.
- On June 30, 2003, it was revealed that the British government decision to
publish a dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction provoked divisions among
the intelligence agencies. The intelligence officials were divided on the content
and the language of the September 2002 dossier. They believed there was no new
intelligence to help the government to make its case for war. The Joint Defence
Committee approved the claim that the Iraqi could deploy weapons of mass destruction
in 45 minutes on September 9, 2002.
- Now on July 2, 2003, Mr Campbell wrote a letter to the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee précising the eleven modifications he suggested should be done
to the intelligence dossier of September 9, 2002. The chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC), John Scarlett, approved the terms of this letter.
None of these suggestions deals with the 45 minutes necessary for the Iraqis
to use their weapons of mass destruction. According to Alastair Campbell this
was already included in the first draft. If this is accepted then Campbell did
not try to mislead the Parliament and the British public.
- On July 3, it was revealed that although Campbell did not add the 45 minutes
clause, the government's dossier on weapons of mass destruction contained significant
more alarming language that the initial intelligence report.
- On July 5, 2003, we are told that the Head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, briefed
senior BBC executives on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction before
the Today programme claimed that Downing Street has sexed up part of the evidence.
The Head of MI6 thought, at the time, that Syria and Iran presented a bigger
threat than Iraq. Blair asked again for a full apology from the BBC, adding
that the charges were the worst attack on his integrity that he had received
as Prime Minister. Tonight the BBC board of governors is meeting in emergency
session to discuss the corporation response to the row.
- On July 6, 2003, the BBC Board of Governors gave full support to the BBC staff,
and went as far as to ask Alastair Campbell to withdraw his allegations of bias
against the BBC and its journalists. They also said that the BBC behaved neutrally
in reporting the war in Iraq.
- On July 7, 2003, the Select foreign Affairs Committee formally cleared Alastair
Campbell of "sexing-up" the Iraqi dossier used to justify invading
Iraq, as well as of the accusation that he personally added that Saddam Hussein
was able to launch his weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of an order.
Blair was also cleared of knowingly lying to the parliament and the country.
- However, the committee was very critical of the way the two dossiers were
written. In their opinion too much emphasis was put on this "45 minutes
launching time" and on the real threat posed to the UK and the Western
World by the Iraqi army. Iraq was conquered in three weeks, and no weapons of
mass destruction was used or found, before and after the war. Soon afterwards
the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats asked for an independent public
inquiry to clarify things once and for all.
- The assertion by Tony Blair and George Bush that Iraq had bought some uranium
from Niger was revealed to be a true lie on July 13, 2003. The British mentioned
this uranium first and the US checked the information and found out that it
was based on faked documents. Britain insisted that they had other sources confirming
it but refused to identify them. And so President Bush mentioned it in his "Message
on the State of the Union" last January 29.
- On July 13, 2003, the relations between the intelligence services of Britain
and the US are in crisis over the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The CIA
and MI6 have already said that they do not trust each other, especially about
the claim that Iraq was trying to buy some uranium from Niger. The CIA does
not believe the claim while MI6 maintains that it is still true even if some
documents were forgeries. According to them, there are other information from
other sources to back the claim.
- On July 15, 2003, Tony Blair and Jack Straw were cross-examined in private
by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the House of Common chaired by
Ann Taylor. The Select Foreign Affairs Committee interrogated Mr Andrew Gilligan,
the BBC journalist, also in private. He will certainly be asked if Dr Kelly
was his source of information on the Iraqi dossier.
- On July 31, 2003, The Guardian told us that the CIA objected to some claims
made by the British government in the September 2002 dossier on Iraq's banned
weapons programmes. In particular the CIA did not believe the Iraqis would be
able to deploy chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction within 45
minutes of an order to do so. This claim was also strongly challenged by Dr
Kelly, and it will be one of the issues that Lord Hutton will have to clarify.
Downing Street did not listen.
- On August 3, 2003, we were told that the MI6 chief, Sir Richard Dearlove,
will leave his job early in 2004. This will damage further more the British
government credibility over its justification of the invasion of Iraq. Being
58 years old it was thought that he would remain two more years in his job.
- On August 16, 2003, The Guardian told us that Tony Blair assertion that Iraq
could deploy its weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes of an order was based
on hearsay information. It was first thought that the information came from
a high level Iraqi officer stil in Iraq, described by the government as a reliable
source. But in fact it came from an informant who passed it to the MI6.
- The government accused the BBC and its journalist, Andrew Gilligan, to broadcast
the allegation that the dossier was "sexed-up" on the base of a single,
anonymous, and uncorroborated source (later known as Dr Kelly). At the same
time the government claim that Iraq could launch weapons of mass destruction
was also based on a single anonymous, uncorroborated source. The only conclusion
is that you cannot trust this government.
- On August 30, 2003, The Guardian revealed that MI5 made an inquiry to identify
Andrew Gilligan's source. They did not identify Dr Kelly as his source even
if they described it as showing "close knowledge of the intelligence used"
and that "he was an expert on current and recent-past Iraq weapons systems".
This, obviously, matched Dr Kelly's profile but nobody made the connection.
- On September 11, 2003, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the British
Parliament published their report on the justification of the war in Iraq. As
the majority of the members are from the Labour party, the criticisms are written
in a very polite tone.
-
. They said that Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, told the committee that
there were dissents within the Intelligences Services on the September 2002
Iraq report. However, he did tell them that some senior intelligence officials
put their comments in writing. The Committee concluded that he was "unhelpful
and potentially misleading". He will keep his job for now.
. Alastair Campbell has been cleared of "sexing up" the government
dossier.
. Tony Blair was blamed for removing from the foreword of the dossier a qualification
that the Iraq could not launch a nuclear attack on Britain. It was also revealed
that the Intelligence Services, before the invasion of Iraq, told Tony Blair
that the war would increase al-Qaida's threat. He ignored the warning, and did
tell neither the Commons nor the country.
. The committee said that Andrew Gilligan, the BBC journalist, was wrong about
his claim that the dossier was "sexed-up".
. John Scarlett, the chairman of the joint intelligence committee was implicitly
criticised for not "highlighting gaps in the UK's knowledge" about
the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. In particular, he should have mentioned
that these weapons of mass destruction said to exist, and useable in 45 minutes
of an order to do so, would be limited to the battlefield.
. Britain went to war on the base of wrong assumptions and lies.
- In September 30, 2003, it was revealed that Blair agreed with Bush during
the summer of 2002 to go to war in Iraq with, or without, the UN agreement.
Buch did not really need any justification. In London, they needed some for
legal reasons. So they introduced the notion that Saddam Hussein had weapons
of mass destruction. The leaders of the British Intelligence Services were told
to confirm it and they were ready to help even if, at a lower level, many officials
were uneasy. Dr Kelly was one of them and he talked about his doubts with at
least three BBC journalists. When he was discovered, his superiors made his
name public, and he committed suicide. This dossier impressed the Americans
including the CIA. Bush and Colin Powelll used some of the British arguments.
- On February 2, 2004, Tony Blair had to follow his master George W. Bush again,
make a U-turn, and set-up an inquiry to establish why Iraq appears to have no
weapons of mass destruction. However, the inquiry will only try to determine
if the intelligence services made any mistake. His choice of the inquirer, Lord
Butler of Brockwell, a former cabinet secretary under Margaret Thatcher, John
Major and a few months with Tony Blair, was perfect. The other four members
will be: the former permanent secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, Sir
John Chilcott; the former chief of defence staff, Field Marshal Lord Inge; the
senior Labour MP, Ann Taylor; the senior Conservative MP, Michael Mates. Being
part of the Establishment they will certainly behave like Lord Hutton, and whitewash
their masters. The Liberal Democrats refused to participate because the extent
of the inquiry, that excludes the political decisions, is too narrow in their
opinion. From the composition one can see at priory that they will not see anything
wrong being all Establishment people; moreover, both MP belong to the Intelligence
Select Committee (ISP) that has already absolved the intelligence services.
The board of inquiry will work in private sessions and will report to Blair
in July; some of the findings will perhaps be made public but not all. This
is democracy British style!
- On February 3, 2004, Blair appeared for his usual 6-monthly appointment before
the Select Committee. He again defended hid decision to go to war in Iraq even
if weapons of mass destruction are never found. He added that the legal basis
for war remained secure since Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with the UN
weapon inspectors "in breach upon breach" of UN resolutions. This
is really strange since the UN inspectors were in Iraq until the war started
and they were told to leave by the American and British governments, not by
Saddam Hussein. He is proud of Britain's decision to invade Iraq, and added
that he would have decided to go to war even if he had known that Saddam Hussein
had no weapons of mass destruction. The real reason why Britain went to war
was that Blair does what Bush wants. In this case Bush wanted the Iraqi oil
and to build his image as a president.
- On February 4, 2004, Tony Blair's credibility over his use of intelligence
was again put in doubt when he said that at the time of the war he was personally
unaware that Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to fire long-range chemical
and biological weapons. In other words, he did not know that Iraq could only
use battlefield weapons within 45 minutes of an order, and not long-range missiles.
Neighbouring counties, as well as Britain and the USA, were not within their
ranges. Strange enough, Mr Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of Defence, and Mr Robin
Cook, the former Leader of the House at that time, knew it. Mr Cook said he
talked to Mr Blair about it on March 5, 2003! Once more it is clear that Tony
Blair is a liar. The session of the British parliament was suspended because
anti-war protesters continued to shout abuses such as "whitewash"
to Blair.
- On February 5, Mr Hoon interrogated by the Common Defence Committee dismissed
the claim that the affirmation that "Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction
within 45 minutes of an order to do it" as "not a significant issue".
So what was significant in the September 2002 dossier justifying the invasion
of Iraq? And why did he not tell Tony Blair that this claim referred only to
short-range battlefield weapons and not to the long-ranges ones?
- On February 25, 2004, the case against the former British intelligence officer,
Katherine Gun, the GCHQ employee who admitted she leaked information about the
American spying operations at the UN before the start of the Iraq war, collapsed
in the Old bailey court in London. Serious doubts about the legality of the
war in Iraq led the prosecution lawyers not to offer any evidence in court.
The prosecution said that there was no "realistic prospect" to convict
her.
- The whistleblower, Katherine Gun, said that she acted to try to stop Britain
illegally invading Iraq. She was arrested about one year ago and charged eight
months later of violation of the Official Secret Act. The government did not
want to test the legality of the war in Iraq without a second UN Security Council
resolution even if the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, finally admitted that
the evasion was legal. Mrs Gun said that she would behave the same way again.
She reacted after she saw an email from the US National Security Agency asking
the GCHQ to bug the offices and homes of some UN diplomats.
- On March 22, 2004, Tony Blair and the British government have been told by
their intelligence advisers that al-Qaida is expanding its network and recruiting
more members as the attraction of global jihad appeals to many young Muslims.
Is this the result of the invasion of Iraq?
- On April 13, 2004, The Guardian reported that British intelligence too could
have helped foil the September 11 2001 attacks on the USA. The Americans arrested
the French terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui on August 16, 2001; they asked Britain
for information on August 21, but the request was not dealt with priority in
London. The British intelligence services informed their US counterparts that
Moussaoui had been trained in the al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan, on September
13!
- On May 6, 2004, Tony Blair created another political row by nominating John
Scarlett as the new head of MI6. Scarlett wrote the weapons of mass destruction
dossier that was used to justify invading Iraq. As it is now clear Iraq had
no such weapons. John Scarlett came out very badly in the Hutton report. Both
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats said that this appointment was "highly
controversial".
- On June 19, 2004 the British intelligence chiefs are afraid that terrorists
could attack the British parliament and the main ministries. They would like
to set up a "security zone" that could extend from Trafalgar Square
to Milbank, blocking off key roads and sealing the parliament debating chambers
with bomb-proof screens. No final decision has been taken yet.
- On July 6, 2004, Tony Blair admitted to the Common Select committee that weapons
of mass destruction may never been found in Iraq, but he again refused to apologise
for the invasion that was still justified in his opinion, with or without these
weapons. He added that Saddam Hussein may have "removed them, hided them,
or even destroyed" them.
- The buck must stop with Prime Minister Tony Blair, and I don't think that
he can escape the consequences of a systemic intelligence failure on Iraq, the
former Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, the top British spy who once headed the Joint
Intelligence Committee, said on July 9, 2004. She drew comparisons between Mr
Blair and George Tenet, forced to quit as CIA over the errors. Mr Blair's appointment
of John Scarlett as head of MI6 would not help him either, Dame Pauline suggested.
- Hans Blix, former chief UN arms inspector in Iraq, told the Butler inquiry
that the intelligence used by Britain and the United States to support their
case for war on Iraq was inaccurate, and the threat of weapons of mass destruction
overstated. The work of the UN inspectors was not taken seriously enough. Blix
said he had pleaded with British Prime Minister Tony Blair to let the inspectors
finish their work before invading Iraq, only to be told that all the intelligence
agencies around the world agreed with Britain and the United States that Iraq
had such weapons. More lies!
- On July 10, 2004, Tony Blair's September 2002 claim that the British intelligence
services told him that Saddam Hussein posed a "current and serious"
threat to Britain is challenged again by the spy chiefs of that time. They now
say that they retracted their claim because they thought the intelligence was
unreliable, and Blair was duly informed. Dr Brian Jones, a retired top Defence
Intelligence Staff official, said that he was "confused" by Mr Blair's
deposition to the Hutton Inquiry, and John Morrison, former deputy chief of
DIS, said that Mr Blair's claims on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction were met
by disbelief in Whitehall. Any doubt that he is a liar?
- Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, warned that Blair would be "judged"
by God for his actions relating to the Iraq war.
- On July 20, 2004, MI6 that was badly criticised in Lord Butler's report is
launching an internal inquiry to find out why its Iraq intelligence was so wrong.
MI6 will be more careful in its relations with Downing Street, making sure that
its findings are not modified. Tony Blair said that the way government would
use intelligence in the future would also be reviewed.
- Britain has tightened controls on the processing of secret intelligence, the
government said on Wednesday March 23, 2005, after Prime Minister Tony Blair
attacked Iraq partly on the basis of what was wrong information. Iraq's stockpiles
of banned arms were the primary motive for the war, but no weapons of mass destruction
have been found. Since the row over Iraq, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),
also known as MI6, and other spy agencies have adopted new safeguards.
- On April 8, 2005, Britain's intelligence chiefs have for the first time admitted
that the claims they made about former Iraq president Saddam Hussein's weapons
of mass destruction were wrong. The admission was made in the 2004-2005 annual
report of the committee presented to the Parliament. The report criticised lack
of communication between ministers and the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6.
It noted that the ministerial cabinet committee on the intelligence services
had not met since December 2003, and even that meeting was the first in more
than seven years.
- Iraq has become "a dominant issue" for Islamic extremists in Britain,
MI5 said on July 27, 2005. The acknowledgement underlines the view of the security
and intelligence services that Iraq has provided an extra motivating force for
terrorists.
- After the July 7 suicide bombings in London, Tony Blair and Jack Straw, the
Foreign Secretary, said there was no connection between these attacks and the
war in Iraq. This conflicted with a leaked assessment by the Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre, based at MI5 and run by a Ministry of Defence official, which
claimed, three weeks before July 7 that Iraq was continuing to act "as
a focus of a range of terrorist related activities in Britain".